Moral disagreement is sometimes thought to pose problems for moral realism because it shows that we cannot achieve knowledge of the moral facts the realists posit. In particular, it is ‘fundamental’ moral disagreement—that is, disagreement that is not due to distorting factors such as ignorance of relevant nonmoral facts, bad reasoning skills, or the like—that is supposed to generate skeptical implications. In this paper, we show that this version of the disagreement challenge is flawed as it stands. The reason is that the epistemic assumptions it requires are incompatible with the possibility of fundamental disagreement. However, we also present an alternative reconstruction of the challenge that avoids the problem. The challenge we present crucially invokes the principle that knowledge requires ‘adherence’. While that requirement is usually not discussed in this context, we argue that it provides a promising explanation of why disagreement sometimes leads to skepticism.

中文翻译：

---

从道德分歧到道德怀疑的新途径

道德分歧有时被认为会给道德现实主义带来问题，因为它表明我们无法了解现实主义者所假设的道德事实。特别是，“根本的”道德分歧——即不是由于对相关非道德事实的无知、糟糕的推理技巧等扭曲因素造成的分歧——应该会产生怀疑的影响。在本文中，我们展示了这个版本的分歧挑战是有缺陷的。原因是它所要求的认知假设与根本分歧的可能性不相容。然而，我们还提出了一种避免该问题的挑战的替代重建。我们提出的挑战关键地援引了知识需要“坚持”的原则。