Personal identity is not always symmetric: even if I will not be a later person, the later person may have been me. What makes this possible is that the relations that are criterial of personal identity—such as memory and anticipation—are asymmetric and ‘count in favor of personal identity from one side only’. Asymmetric personal identity can be accommodated by temporal counterpart theory but not by Lewisian overlapping aggregates of person stages. The question of uncertainty in cases of personal fission (and in Everettian quantum mechanics) is also discussed.

中文翻译：

---

非对称个人身份

个人身份并不总是对称的：即使我不是后来的人，后来的人也可能是我。使这成为可能的原因在于，作为个人身份标准的关系——例如记忆和预期——是不对称的，并且“仅从一方来看有利于个人身份”。不对称的个人身份可以通过时间对应理论来适应，但不能通过刘易斯重叠的个人阶段聚合来适应。还讨论了个人裂变（以及埃弗里特量子力学）中的不确定性问题。