Husserl’s theory of empathy plays a crucial role in his transcendental phenomenology and has ever since been critically examined. Among various critiques leveled at Husserl, the issue of bodily similarity between oneself and the other lies at the core, not only because Husserl conceives of it as the motivating factor of empathy but also because his account of it has been taken to be problematic. In this article, I review a main interpretation of the issue of bodily similarity in Husserl, which takes the bodily similarity in question to be a visual resemblance between oneself and the other. By contrast, I give a new interpretation of bodily similarity by taking into account Husserl’s emphasis on tactual experience with regard to the constitution of one’s own lived body and the foreign body. I argue that the bodily similarity in question amounts to a similar manner of twofold bodily manifestation in oneself and the other, and I also suggest that this interpretation further enables a new understanding of interpersonal relation in Husserl.

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激发移情：胡塞尔移情理论中的身体相似性问题

胡塞尔的同理心理论在他的先验现象学中起着至关重要的作用，并且此后一直受到批判性研究。在针对胡塞尔的各种批评中，自己与他人身体相似的问题处于核心位置，不仅因为胡塞尔将其视为同理心的驱动因素，还因为他对它的描述被认为是有问题的。在本文中，我回顾了胡塞尔对身体相似性问题的主要解释，该解释将所讨论的身体相似性视为自己与他人之间的视觉相似性。相比之下，我通过考虑胡塞尔对关于自己的生命体和异物的构成的触觉经验的强调，对身体相似性给出了新的解释。