Ignorance usually excuses from responsibility, unless the person is culpable for the ignorance itself. Since a lot of wrongdoing occurs in ignorance, the question of what makes ignorance culpable is central for a theory of moral responsibility. In this article I examine a prominent answer, which I call the ‘volitionalist tracing account,’ and criticize it on the grounds that it relies on an overly restrictive conception of responsibility-relevant control. I then propose an alternative, which I call the ‘capacitarian conception of control,’ and on the basis of it I advance an account of culpable ignorance that avoids the skeptical upshots of the volitionalist proposal. If correct, my account establishes three important truths: agents can be directly in control of their ignorance, they can be directly responsible for more than actions and omissions, and their moral obligations extend beyond the performance of intentional actions and omissions.

中文翻译：

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无知的罪魁祸首

无知通常可以作为免责的借口，除非这个人要为无知本身负责。由于许多不法行为发生在无知中，什么使无知有罪的问题是道德责任理论的核心。在这篇文章中，我研究了一个突出的答案，我称之为“意志主义追踪帐户”，并批评它，理由是它依赖于过度限制性的责任相关控制概念。然后，我提出了一个替代方案，我称之为“控制的资本主义概念”，并在此基础上我提出了一种对有罪的无知的描述，以避免意志主义提议的怀疑结果。如果正确的话，我的叙述确立了三个重要的事实：代理人可以直接控制他们的无知，他们可以直接对行为和疏忽承担更多责任，