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Kant's Conceptualism: a New Reading of the Transcendental Deduction
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Pub Date : 2017-03-27 , DOI: 10.1111/papq.12189
Justin B. Shaddock 1
Affiliation  

I defend a novel interpretation of Kant's conceptualism regarding the contents of our perceptual experiences. Conceptualist interpreters agree that Kant's Deduction aims to prove that intuitions require the categories for their spatiality and temporality. But conceptualists disagree as to which features of space and time make intuitions require the categories. Interpreters have cited the singularity, unity, infinity, and homogeneity of space and time. But this is incompatible with Kant's Aesthetic, which aims to prove that these same features qualify space and time as intuitions, not concepts. On my interpretation, the feature is objectivity. Space and time are objective, in that they ground our judgments in geometry and mechanics.

中文翻译:

康德的概念主义:先验演绎的新解读

我捍卫对康德关于我们知觉体验内容的概念主义的新颖解释。概念主义解释者同意康德的演绎旨在证明直觉需要它们的空间性和时间性的范畴。但是概念主义者不同意空间和时间的哪些特征使直觉需要这些类别。解释者引用了空间和时间的奇异性、统一性、无限性和同质性。但这与康德的美学不相容,后者旨在证明这些相同的特征将空间和时间限定为直觉,而不是概念。在我的解释中,特点是客观。空间和时间是客观的,因为它们以几何学和力学为基础。
更新日期:2017-03-27
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