This article rejects Gideon Rosen's skeptical argument that attributions of blameworthiness are never epistemically justified. Granting Rosen's controversial claim that an act is blameworthy only if it is either akratic or the causal upshot of some akratic act, I show that we can and should resist his skeptical conclusion. I show, first, that Rosen's argument is, at best, hostage to a much more global skepticism about attributions of praiseworthiness, doxastic justification, and other phenomena which essentially involve causal-historical facts about mental states. I then show how, equipped with proper background knowledge, we can justifiedly attribute blameworthiness.

中文翻译：

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关于道德责任的怀疑论

这篇文章拒绝了 Gideon Rosen 的怀疑论点，即应受指责的归因从来没有在认识论上合理化。承认罗森有争议的主张，即一项行为只有在不道德或某些不道德行为的因果结果时才应受到谴责，我表明我们可以而且应该抵制他的怀疑结论。首先，我表明，罗森的论点充其量只是受制于对值得称赞的归因、信念式辩护和其他本质上涉及关于心理状态的因果历史事实的现象的更加全球性的怀疑。然后，我将展示如何在配备适当的背景知识的情况下，合理地归咎于应受指责。