I present an internal problem for David Lewis’s genuine modal realism. My aim is to show that his analysis of modality is inconsistent with his metaphysics. I consider several ways of modifying the Lewisian analysis of modality, but argue that none are successful. I argue that the problem also affects theories related to genuine modal realism, including the stage theory of persistence and modal fictionalism.

中文翻译：

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高级模化问题

我提出了大卫刘易斯真正的模态实在论的内部问题。我的目的是表明他对模态的分析与他的形而上学不一致。我考虑了几种修改刘易斯模态分析的方法，但认为没有一种方法是成功的。我认为这个问题也影响了与真正的模态现实主义相关的理论，包括持久性和模态虚构主义的阶段理论。