In this paper, we argue that this proposed analysis of ‘will’ both lacks linguistic motivation and faces a variety of significant problems. We show that the standard arguments for Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions fail to apply to statements of the form ‘will(f)’. Hence, one can agree with Russell on definite descriptions, without that providing any motivation for the claim that statements of the form ‘will(f)’ should be given a quasi-Russellian analysis. For example, the structural ambiguities that are predicted by the Russellian analysis of descriptions are unattested when it comes to sentences of the form ‘will(f)’ embedded under e.g. negation and various attitude verbs. Consequently, we contend that the quasi-Russellian analysis makes the wrong predictions about the meaning of sentences of the form ‘will(f)’. Finally, we consider a possible fallback position: one could think that a weaker version of Todd’s position, without the Russellian baggage, might withstand our objections. But if Todd’s proposal is construed in this minimal way, i.e. as a claim merely about the truth-conditions of ‘will(f)’, given a certain sophistication to avoid the falsity of future necessities, the view collapses into another view that Todd has antecedently dismissed. This not only renders Todd’s analysis redundant, it leaves us with an analysis that according to Todd himself is inadequate.

中文翻译：

---

反对罗素的开放未来

在本文中，我们认为这种对“意志”的拟议分析既缺乏语言动机又面临着各种重大问题。我们表明，罗素处理确定描述的标准论证不适用于“will(f)”形式的陈述。因此，人们可以在明确的描述上同意罗素，而不会为“will(f)”形式的陈述应该给予准罗素分析的主张提供任何动机。例如，当涉及嵌入在例如否定和各种态度动词下的“will(f)”形式的句子时，由罗素的描述分析预测的结构歧义是未经证实的。因此，我们认为准罗素分析对“will(f)”形式的句子的含义做出了错误的预测。最后，我们考虑了一种可能的后备立场：人们可能认为托德立场的较弱版本，没有罗素包袱，可能经得起我们的反对。但是，如果托德的提议以这种最低限度的方式来解释，即仅仅作为关于“will(f)”的真值条件的断言，考虑到一定的复杂性以避免未来必需品的虚假性，那么该观点就会崩溃为托德所拥有的另一种观点之前被驳回。这不仅使托德的分析变得多余，而且使我们得到了根据托德本人的分析是不充分的。考虑到一定的复杂性，以避免未来必需品的虚假性，这种观点会崩溃为托德此前已驳回的另一种观点。这不仅使托德的分析变得多余，而且使我们得到了根据托德本人的分析是不充分的。考虑到一定的复杂性，以避免未来必需品的虚假性，这种观点会崩溃为托德此前已驳回的另一种观点。这不仅使托德的分析变得多余，而且使我们得到了根据托德本人的分析是不充分的。