abstract:Berkeley's idealism and his theory of signs are linked by his doctrine that mind is the cause by which objects are intelligible. What this means in the context of his claim that minds are spiritual substances has puzzled commentators, many of whom explain Berkeley's position by suggesting that he draws on Cartesian assumptions. However, such explanations treat mind as an abstraction, something that Berkeley explicitly rejects. I argue instead that God creates finite spiritual substances by creating a system of representation in which objects are related in a way that constitutes a language (i.e. the language of nature). 'Mind' is thus the principle on which the meaning of ideas depends, not a Cartesian substance. Instead, it is the principle of intelligibility in terms of which questions about animal mentality and human freedom can be answered.

中文翻译：

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伯克利的非笛卡尔精神实质概念

摘要：伯克利的唯心主义和他的符号理论通过他的学说联系在一起，即心灵是物体可理解的原因。在他声称思想是精神物质的背景下，这意味着什么让评论家感到困惑，其中许多人通过暗示他借鉴笛卡尔假设来解释伯克利的立场。然而，这种解释将思想视为一种抽象，伯克利明确拒绝了这一点。相反，我认为上帝通过创建一个表示系统来创造有限的精神实体，其中对象以构成语言（即自然语言）的方式相关联。因此，“心灵”是观念意义所依赖的原则，而不是笛卡尔的实质。反而，