abstract:Emphasizing the abstractness of figures, recent scholarship has tended to reject the standard view that geometrical figures belong in Spinoza's "book of nature." In this paper, I outline an interpretation of Spinozan nature as geometrically tractable that both addresses the challenges facing the standard view and clarifies its basis. I argue that many of the problems that have been raised about figures are actually problems for bodies qua finite, not qua figural. To the extent that finite bodies exist in Spinozan nature, geometrical figures have a place as the determinations of finite bodies. Geometry, moreover, is relevant to the knowledge of the geometrical properties of finite bodies. The need for continuity between intellectual and imaginative conceptions of finite bodies implied by the role of experience in Spinoza's scientific method speaks in favor of the adequacy of geometrical conceptions of finite bodies. I suggest that Spinoza countenances the deployment of intellectual geometric conceptions as part of a hypothetico-deductive approach to natural science.

中文翻译：

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斯宾诺莎自然之书中的几何图形

摘要：强调图形的抽象性，最近的学术倾向于拒绝几何图形属于斯宾诺莎的“自然之书”的标准观点。在这篇论文中，我概述了对斯宾诺赞自然的解释，它在几何上易于处理，既解决了标准视图面临的挑战，又阐明了其基础。我认为，许多关于数字的问题实际上是关于有限物体的问题，而不是拟数字物体的问题。就有限物体存在于斯宾诺赞的自然界而言，几何图形在有限物体的确定中占有一席之地。此外，几何与有限物体几何特性的知识有关。经验在斯宾诺莎中的作用所暗示的有限物体的智力和想象概念之间需要连续性 的科学方法支持有限物体的几何概念的充分性。我建议斯宾诺莎支持将智力几何概念作为自然科学假设演绎方法的一部分。