An important feature of conscience, for John Henry Newman, is the capacity to sense things divine.1 This feature entails a kind of moral perception. In some texts, for example, Newman describes conscience as the capacity to “perceive the voice, or the echoes of the voice, of a Master, living, personal, and sovereign” (Grammar 77; see also Philosophical Notebook 59; Certain Difficulties 247, 255; Parochial and Plain Sermons 237). However, he complicates things a bit in his sermon, “The Usurpations of Reason,” by stating that our capacity to detect moral truths happens “without any intelligible reasoning process” (Fifteen Sermons 56). At first glance, one may conclude from this quotation that conscience and reason, for Newman, are not only distinct but that the former does not need the latter to detect moral truths. In this article, I argue that such a conclusion misses both the subtlety of Newman’s employment of the term “reasoning” in this sermon and his understanding of the relationship between conscience and reason. More specifically, Newman’s discussion of the relationship between reason and conscience needs to be couched within his overall account of faith and reason. For example, one of Newman’s main concerns in the Fifteen Sermons Preached Before the University of Oxford is to examine existing accounts of faith and reason and thus to clarify the conditions under which Christian belief (or for that matter any belief) can be considered rational. Conscience certainly includes a perceptual feature, especially given Newman’s emphasis on its basic or pre-trained aspect, but background beliefs, training, experience, and practice play a crucial role in how we learn to perceive and make sense of things divine. As I hope to show, Newman’s notion of an “educated conscience” is saturated (or shaped) by a kind of implicit reasoning, the operation of which is external to a person’s awareness.2 Along these lines, I will restrict the focus of this article to four aspects of Newman’s thought on conscience. The first section will explain in what sense Newman thinks of conscience as a natural element of our cognitive existence. The second section will spell out Newman’s notion of an edu-

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有教养的良心：纽曼对良心的理解和理性

对约翰·亨利·纽曼（John Henry Newman）而言，良心的一个重要特征是感知事物神圣的能力。1此特征需要一种道德观念。例如，在某些文本中，纽曼将良心描述为“感知主人，生活，个人和主权者的声音或声音回声的能力”（语法77；另见《哲学笔记本》 59；某些困难247）。 255；狭Par和普通布道237）。但是，他指出说我们发现道德真理的能力“没有任何可理解的推理过程”发生，使布道“使人篡夺理性”变得有些复杂（十五讲道56）。乍一看，可以从这句话中得出结论：对于纽曼来说，良心和理性不仅是截然不同的，而且前者不需要后者来发现道德真理。在本文中，我认为，这样的结论既错过了纽曼在讲道中使用“推理”一词的微妙之处，也错过了他对良心与理性之间关系的理解。更具体地说，纽曼关于理性与良心之间关系的讨论需要纳入他对信念和理性的整体描述。例如，在牛津大学之前宣讲的十五讲中，纽曼最关心的问题之一就是研究现有的信仰和理性，从而弄清基督教信仰（或任何信仰）被认为是理性的条件。良心当然具有感性特征，特别是考虑到纽曼强调其基本或预先训练的方面，但背景信念，训练，经验，和实践在我们学会感知和理解事物方面起着至关重要的作用。正如我希望展示的那样，纽曼的“受过教育的良心”概念被一种隐式推理所饱和（或塑造），其隐含的推理是人的知觉所固有的。2沿着这些思路，我将限制本文的重点文章涉及纽曼良心思想的四个方面。第一部分将解释纽曼在何种意义上将良心视为我们认知存在的自然要素。第二部分将阐明纽曼的教育理念，我将本文的重点局限于纽曼良心思想的四个方面。第一部分将解释纽曼在何种意义上将良心视为我们认知存在的自然要素。第二部分将阐明纽曼的教育理念，我将本文的重点局限于纽曼良心思想的四个方面。第一部分将解释纽曼在何种意义上将良心视为我们认知存在的自然要素。第二部分将阐明纽曼的教育理念，