IN his most recent book, Latin Americanism After 9/11, John Beverley provocatively revisits the discussion surrounding the legacy of armed struggle in Latin American political culture; or, more precisely, the question of how the period of revolutionary guerrilla warfare that extends from 1959 to 1990 is remembered today. This periodization corresponds, of course, to the historical cycle that opened with the triumph of the Cuban Revolution and came to an end with the electoral defeat of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua (Beverley 95-96). Beverley's own way of addressing this question leads to a critique of what he calls the "paradigm of disillusion"--in short, the tendency, prominent among a number of leftist intellectuals active in the period, to remember the armed struggle as a romantic but ultimately mistaken conception about social change in Latin America. (1) It is not my intention to debate in this article Beverley's claims that "there is a correlation between how one thinks about the armed struggle in Latin America and how one thinks about the nature and possibilities of the new governments of the marea rosada" (95), or that one's vision of the armed struggle defines one's position vis-avis the "neoliberal hegemony" in the region (98). As many commentators have pointed out, these are highly problematic assumptions leading to broad generalizations and simplistic Manichean readings of the Latin American political field. (2) However, I do find intriguing his underlying invitation to reflect on the tensions, legacies, and contradictions of this turbulent period. After all, even as tragic attempts to overcome inequality and injustice, the events, ideas, and practices surrounding the revolutionary cycle showed a certain uniqueness in their configuration, while also leaving, for better and worse, permanent traces in the social, political, and cultural fabric of many Latin American societies. One could easily acknowledge that, even if the original conditions that brought together guerrilla warfare and revolutionary politics in the 20th century (poverty, exclusion, discrimination, exploitation) have not disappeared and continue to be as pressing as ever, today the belief in the efficacy of armed struggle has certainly lost its force and become impractical as a form of social and political change in the region. Furthermore, some of the ideological assumptions that framed these projects have often been found questionable and denounced as still hierarchical and authoritarian, a top-down model blind to gender and ethnic diversity, imbued with sacrificial messianism, and, as Beverley himself suggests, responsible for "polarizing society" between "friends and enemies" in addition to being at times reckless regarding the loss of human lives (97). It is in fact difficult to refute accusations that leftist guerrilla groups in Latin American favored "a predominantly masculine ethos" which in some cases could "only be fully realized through death" (Franco 121; 127), or that they promoted a vertical conception of the political in which the masculine revolutionary subject "pretends to speak in the name of the collectivity" (Rodriguez 32). Equally problematic is perhaps what Maria Josefina Saldana-Portillo has termed as the "development-revolution convergence," that is, the implicit reproduction of developmentalist models of political subjectivity, human agency, and socio-historical progress within the project of the revolutionary left (4-7). (3) A reflection on the potential legacies of the cycle of armed revolution in Latin America (or elsewhere) should certainly remain critical of, and be careful not to repeat or justify, these ideological components. It should not necessarily translate into an apology of violent guerrilla tactics, or (and here we have to depart from Beverley's perspective) into clear-cut dichotomic subdivisions of contemporary political configurations or knee-jerk loyalties to constituted governments, be they of the so-called marea rosada or any other kind. …

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超越“世界二元论”：游击队的经验和政治生态学（阿普洛斯·奥马尔·卡贝萨的《世界报》）

约翰·贝弗利（John Beverley）在他的最新著作《拉丁美洲主义9/11之后》中挑衅性地重新讨论了有关拉丁美洲政治文化中武装斗争的遗产的讨论。或者，更确切地说，今天还记得关于从1959年到1990年的革命性游击战争时期的问题。当然，这种周期划分对应于历史周期，该历史周期随着古巴革命的胜利而开启，并随着尼加拉瓜桑迪诺斯塔人的选举失败而结束（贝弗利95-96）。贝弗利自己解决这个问题的方式引发了对他所谓的“幻灭范式”的批评-总之，这一趋势在这一时期活跃的许多左翼知识分子中尤为突出，记得武装斗争是对拉丁美洲社会变革的一种浪漫但最终被误解的观念。（1）我无意在本文中辩论贝弗利的主张，即“人们如何看待拉丁美洲的武装斗争与人们如何看待罗萨达新政府的性质和可能性之间存在相关性” （95），或者一个人对武装斗争的看法确定了自己相对于该地区“新自由主义霸权”的立场（98）。正如许多评论家所指出的那样，这些都是极具问题的假设，导致对拉丁美洲政治领域的广泛概括和对马尼切的简单化解读。（2）但是，我的确吸引了他的潜在邀请，以反思紧张局势，遗产，和这个动荡时期的矛盾。毕竟，即使是为克服不平等和不公正而进行的悲剧性尝试，围绕革命周期的事件，思想和实践在其结构上也显示出了一定的独特性，同时在社会，政治和政治上也留下了永久的痕迹，无论好坏，许多拉丁美洲社会的文化结构。人们可以轻易地承认，即使将20世纪游击战和革命政治结合起来的原始条件（贫穷，排斥，歧视，剥削）并没有消失，而且仍然像以往一样紧迫，今天人们仍然相信效力武装斗争的势力无疑已经丧失了力量，作为该地区社会和政治变革的一种形式变得不切实际。此外，构成这些项目的某些意识形态假设经常被质疑和谴责为仍然是等级制和专制的，是一种对性别和种族多样性无视的自上而下的模式，充满了牺牲性的弥赛亚主义，而且正如贝弗利本人所建议的那样，负责“两极分化”。 “社会”中的“朋友和敌人”之间的关系，有时甚至不计后果地考虑到生命的丧失（97）。事实上，很难驳斥指责说，拉丁美洲的游击团体拥护“主要是男性气概”，在某些情况下“只能通过死亡才能完全实现”（弗兰科121； 127），或者他们提倡一种垂直观念。男性革命主体“假装以集体的名义讲话”的政治 （罗德里格斯32）。同样有问题的也许是玛丽亚·何塞菲娜·萨尔达娜·波蒂略（Maria Josefina Saldana-Portillo）所说的“发展-革命趋同”，也就是说，在革命左派的项目中隐性地再现了政治主观性，人的代理权和社会历史进步的发展主义模式（ 4-7）。（3）对于拉丁美洲（或其他地区）武装革命周期的潜在遗产的反思，当然应该保持批评，并注意不要重复或证明这些意识形态成分。它不一定要转化为对付暴力游击策略的道歉，或者（这里我们必须偏离贝弗利的观点）转化为对当代政治结构的明确二分法或对建制政府的直率忠诚，无论是所谓的罗萨达（marrea rosada）还是其他任何类型的人。…