Several authors have recently suggested that moral factors and norms ‘encroach’ on the epistemic, and because of salient parallels to pragmatic encroachment views in epistemology, these suggestions have been dubbed ‘moral encroachment views’. This paper distinguishes between variants of themoral encroachment thesis, pointing out how they address different problems, are motivated by different considerations, and are not all subject to the same objections. It also explores how the family of moral encroachment views compare to classical pragmatic encroachment accounts.

中文翻译：

---

道德侵蚀的种类

几位作者最近提出道德因素和规范“侵占”认识论，并且由于与认识论中的语用侵占观点明显相似，这些建议被称为“道德侵占观”。本文区分了道德侵占论文的变体，指出它们如何解决不同的问题，受到不同考虑的推动，并且并非都受到相同的反对。它还探讨了道德侵犯观点家族与经典实用主义侵犯观点的比较。