Sometimes philosophers believe, rightly or wrongly, that a region of (declarative) discourse is in need of their help—that vindicating its standing requires the kind of treatment that a philosopher might be able to offer. There is a wide variety of circumstances leading to this situation. In many cases, a perceived tension between naturalism and the ostensible subject matter of the discourse is an important factor, but there could in principle be lines of reasoning leading to the conclusion that a discourse needs philosophical help in which naturalism is not involved. I am going to discuss the situation focusing on linguistic items—sentences and terms, but parallel problems arise for their mental correlates—beliefs and concepts, and I’ll be interested only in proposals for the linguistic version of the task that don’t presuppose that the mental version has already been accomplished. There are several general approaches that a philosopher can adopt to discharge this kind of task. One that has attracted some attention in recent years seeks to explicate a discourse in terms of features of the practice in which the discourse is embedded—of what speakers do with the expressions in the discourse. Its central insight is the Wittgensteinian thought that the semantic properties of linguistic expressions are determined by how they are used. There are several ways of articulating this insight. The one I want to focus on proposes to vindicate the discourse by identifying features of the practice in which it is embedded that are necessary and sufficient for generating its semantic properties: a discourse will have the semantic properties of the target discourse if and only if it is embedded in a practice in which these features are present. I’m going to refer to features of a linguistic practice that can play this role with respect to its discourse as pragmatic grounds, and to the project of vindicating

中文翻译：

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信念、欲望和行为预测

有时，哲学家们正确或错误地认为，（陈述性）话语的某个领域需要他们的帮助——证明其地位需要哲学家可能能够提供的那种待遇。导致这种情况的情况多种多样。在许多情况下，自然主义与话语表面主题之间的感知张力是一个重要因素，但原则上可能有推理线索可以得出结论，即话语需要哲学帮助，而自然主义不涉及。我将讨论侧重于语言项目的情况——句子和术语，但它们的心理关联——信念和概念，出现了平行的问题，我只会对不预先假定心理版本已经完成的任务的语言版本的建议感兴趣。哲学家可以采用几种一般方法来完成这种任务。近年来引起了一些关注的一种方法试图根据话语所嵌入的实践的特征来解释话语——说话者对话语中的表达做了什么。它的核心见解是维特根斯坦的思想，即语言表达的语义属性取决于它们的使用方式。有几种方法可以阐明这种见解。我想重点讨论的一个建议是通过识别它所嵌入的实践的特征来证明话语是正确的，这些特征对于生成其语义属性是必要和充分的：当且仅当一个话语具有目标话语的语义属性嵌入在具有这些特征的实践中。我将在作为语用基础的话语中提及可以在其话语方面发挥这种作用的语言实践的特征，以及证明项目