The Singapore Court of Appeal’s decision in Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v Public Prosecutor represents a substantial development in Singapore’s law on the doctrine of severability in constitutional review. An examination of Prabagaran reveals rich theoretical underpinnings relating to the nature of legislative intent. The case rightly locates the crux of the severability inquiry in secondary legislative intention: in other words, the legislature’s intention, at the time a statute was enacted, as to what should happen in the event that part of the statute is later held to be unconstitutional. This approach is preferable to the approach of asking whether excision of unconstitutional parts of the legislation would leave behind something which is “substantially a different law”, an approach which can lead to the judicial frustration of legislative policy. The search for secondary legislative intent is not just a matter of speculation; Prabagaran demonstrates how it may be inferred from evidence such as the structure of legislation, legislative history, and speeches in Parliament. In addition, Prabagaran highlights the importance of applicants’ identifying precisely the object of a constitutional challenge and the exact reliefs sought.

中文翻译：

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宪法审查中的可分割性原则：来自新加坡的视角

新加坡上诉法院在 Prabagaran a/l Srivijayan v Public Prosecutor 案中的裁决代表了新加坡关于宪法审查中可分割性原则的法律的重大发展。对 Prabagaran 的考察揭示了与立法意图的性质相关的丰富的理论基础。本案正确地将可分割性调查的症结定位在次要立法意图中：换句话说，立法机关在制定法规时的意图是，如果该法规的一部分后来被认定为违宪，将会发生什么. 这种方法比询问删除立法中违宪部分是否会留下“实质上不同的法律”的方法更可取，一种可能导致立法政策受到司法挫败的方法。寻求次要的立法意图不仅仅是一种猜测；Prabagaran 展示了如何从立法结构、立法历史和议会演讲等证据中推断出它。此外，普拉巴加兰强调了申请人准确确定宪法挑战的对象和寻求的确切救济的重要性。