The North Atlantic Treaty Organizations (NATO) public-private Space Asset Supply Chain (SASC) currently exhibits significant cybersecurity gaps. It is well-established that data obtained from space assets is fundamental to NATO, as they allow for the facilitation of its missions, self-defence and effective deterrence of its adversaries. Any hostile cyber operation, suspending control over a space asset, severely impacts both NATO missions and allied Member States national security. This threat is exacerbated by NATOs mostly unregulated cyber SASC. Hence, this thesis answers a twofold research question: a) What are current cybersecurity gaps along NATOs global SASC; and b) How can NATO and its allied Member States gain greater control over such gaps to safeguard the supply of NATO mission-critical information? An ontological field study is carried out by conducting nineteen semi-structured interviews with high-level representatives from relevant public, private and academic organizations. This research was undertaken in collaboration with the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) in Tallinn, Estonia. This thesis concludes that current cybersecurity gaps along NATOs SASC are caused by cyber vulnerabilities such as legacy systems or the use of Commercial-Off-the-Shelf (COTS) technology. Inadequate cyber SASC management is caused by hindrances such as misaligned classification levels and significant understaffing. On this basis, NATO should consider two major collaboration initiatives: a) Raising Awareness throughout the whole of the NATO system, and b) Pushing forward the creation of regulation through a standardized security framework on SASC cybersecurity. Doing so would enable NATO and its Member States to recognise cyberthreats to mission-critical data early on along its cyber SASC, and thus increase transparency, responsibility, and liability.

中文翻译：

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北约面临威胁的关键任务太空能力：军事太空资产供应链中的网络安全缺口

目前，北大西洋公约组织（NATO）的公私航天资产供应链（SASC）表现出重大的网络安全漏洞。公认的是，从空间资产获得的数据对北约而言至关重要，因为它们可以促进其飞行任务，自卫和对敌人进行有效的威慑。任何敌对的网络行动都将暂停对太空资产的控制，这将严重影响北约任务和盟国的国家安全。北约大多不受管制的网络SASC加剧了这一威胁。因此，本论文回答了一个双重研究问题：a）北约全球SASC当前的网络安全差距是什么？b）北约及其盟国如何才能更好地控制这种差距以保障北约关键任务信息的提供？通过与相关公共，私人和学术组织的高层代表进行十九次半结构化访谈，进行了本体论现场研究。这项研究是与位于爱沙尼亚塔林的北约卓越合作网络防御中心（CCDCOE）合作进行的。本文的结论是，北约SASC上当前的网络安全漏洞是由诸如传统系统或使用现成商业（COTS）技术之类的网络漏洞引起的。网络SASC管理不充分是由诸如分类级别未对准和人员严重不足等障碍引起的。在此基础上，北约应考虑两项主要的合作倡议：a）在整个北约系统中提高意识，并且b）通过关于SASC网络安全的标准化安全框架，推动制定法规。这样做将使北约及其成员国能够早日沿其网络SASC识别对关键任务数据的网络威胁，从而提高透明度，责任感和责任感。