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Cooperation against all predictions
Economic Inquiry ( IF 1.710 ) Pub Date : 2021-02-22 , DOI: 10.1111/ecin.12976
Friedel Bolle 1 , Jörg Spiller 2
Affiliation  

In Binary Threshold Public Good (BTPG) games, n players have binary choices: cooperation or non-cooperation. If at least k players cooperate, a public good is produced. The case k = n is the Stag Hunt game with the two pure strategy equilibria E1 (all players cooperate) and E0 (no player cooperates). In four rather diverse examples of four-player Stag Hunt games, three prominent concepts of equilibrium selection favor E0. Experiments, however, result in cooperation frequencies between 70.3% and 99.7%. Also for k < n, the selected equilibria clearly differ from experimental behavior. We interpret our observations by suggesting the concept Behavioral Equilibrium Selection.

中文翻译:

针对所有预测的合作

在二元阈值公共物品 (BTPG) 游戏中,n 个玩家有二元选择:合作或不合作。如果至少 k 个参与者合作,则产生公共物品。k = n的情况是具有两个纯策略均衡 E1(所有参与者合作)和 E0(没有参与者合作)的 Stag Hunt 博弈。在四人 Stag Hunt 游戏的四个相当不同的例子中,均衡选择的三个突出概念有利于 E0。但是,实验得出的合作频率介于70.3%和99.7%之间。同样对于k < n,所选的平衡明显不同于实验行为。我们通过提出行为均衡选择的概念来解释我们的观察结果。
更新日期:2021-02-22
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