The classic Aaron–Samuelson result argues that pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pension schemes cannot coexist with higher-return, private, retirement-saving schemes. The ensuing literature shows if agents voluntarily undersave for retirement due to myopia or time-inconsistency, then a paternalistic, rationale for PAYG pensions arises only if voluntary retirement saving is fully crowded out because of a binding borrowing constraint. This paper generalizes the discussion to the reference-dependent utility setup of Kőszegi and Rabin (2009) where undersaving happens naturally. No borrowing constraint is imposed. We show it is possible to offer a non-paternalistic, welfare rationale for return-dominated, PAYG pensions to coexist with private, retirement saving.

中文翻译：

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参考依赖偏好、时间不一致和现收现付养老金

经典的 Aaron-Samuelson 结果认为现收现付 (PAYG) 养老金计划不能与更高回报的私人退休储蓄计划共存。随后的文献表明，如果代理商由于近视或时间不一致而自愿地为退休储蓄不足，那么只有当由于约束性借款约束而将自愿退休储蓄完全挤出时，PAYG养老金才会出现家长式的理由。本文将讨论推广到 Kőszegi 和 Rabin (2009) 的参考依赖效用设置，其中自然发生储蓄不足。没有施加借贷限制。我们表明，有可能为回报主导的现收现付养老金与私人退休储蓄共存提供一个非家长式的福利理由。