Most information that public firms are required to disclose is relatively hard (e.g., historical information), whereas the disclosure of relevant information that is softer in nature (e.g., forward-looking information) is typically left to firms' discretion. The lack of a mandatory requirement to disclose soft information has been at the heart of a number of on-going accounting debates. This study shows that while mandating disclosure increases the frequency of disclosure, it results in a reduction in disclosure quality when information is soft. By exploring this tradeoff, the paper sheds light on the merits of restricting mandatory disclosure requirements to verifiable information and leaving disclosure of soft information unregulated. The value of leaving disclosure unregulated is shown to be maximized when managers are given bonus-based compensation, with minimum performance thresholds and maximum caps, similar to those documented in the literature.

要求上市公司披露的大多数信息都是相对困难的（例如，历史信息），而本质上较软的相关信息（例如，前瞻性信息）的披露通常要由公司自行决定。缺乏强制性要求披露软信息一直是许多正在进行的会计辩论的核心。这项研究表明，虽然强制公开会增加公开的频率，但当信息不充分时，会导致公开质量的下降。通过探索这种权衡，本文揭示了将强制性公开要求限制为可验证信息，而使软信息公开不受监管的优点。