The paper explores the use of statistical data and statistical assumptions as evidence in criminal trials. It is suggested that a finding of guilt includes not only its main factual proposition but also additional propositions that support and affirm it. Specifically, it includes not only the proposition that the defendant committed the offence but also the additional affirming proposition that it is this defendant rather than any other potential defendant who committed the offence (the ‘D rather than A’ proposition). Some statistical generalisations provide reasons in defence of the main proposition but not in defence of the affirming proposition, which then remains random or arbitrary. Yet since criminal convictions include a moral judgement, they cannot be justified where some of their propositions are arbitrary. Accordingly, such statistical generalisations cannot justify a criminal conviction.

中文翻译：

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可能的和非任意的：认定有罪的证据基础

本文探讨了在刑事审判中使用统计数据和统计假设作为证据。有人认为，有罪认定不仅包括其主要事实命题，还包括支持和肯定它的附加命题。具体来说，它不仅包括被告犯罪的命题，而且还包括附加的肯定命题，即是该被告而不是任何其他潜在的被告实施了犯罪（“D而不是A”命题）。一些统计概括提供了为主要命题辩护的理由，但不为肯定命题辩护，后者仍然是随机的或任意的。然而，由于刑事定罪包括道德判断，因此如果他们的某些命题是任意的，他们就不能被证明是正当的。因此，