This paper investigates the process of reasoning through which a judge determines whether a precedent-case gives her a binding reason to follow in her present-case. I review the objections that have been raised against the two main accounts of reasoning by precedent: the rule-account and the analogy-account. I argue that both accounts can be made viable by amending them to meet the objections. Nonetheless, I believe that there is an argument for preferring accounts that integrate analogical reasoning: any account of reasoning by precedent that is descriptively minimally adequate will leave some room for judicial discretion. Discretion should be used under consideration of the best legally relevant arguments for and against a decision. Integrating analogical reasoning helps the judge to bring to her own attention the strongest case for following. Analogical reasoning also eases the recognition of possible reasons for distinguishing. Thereby, it facilitates a more balanced decision-making process.

中文翻译：

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先例推理——在规则和类比之间

本文研究了法官判断一个先例是否给她一个有约束力的理由在她的本案中遵循的推理过程。我回顾了针对先例推理的两个主要账户提出的反对意见：规则账户和类比账户。我认为，通过修改它们以满足反对意见，这两个帐户都可以变得可行。尽管如此，我认为有一个论据支持更喜欢整合类比推理的说明：任何描述性最低限度的先例推理说明都会为司法自由裁量权留下一些空间。应在考虑支持和反对决定的最佳法律相关论据的情况下使用自由裁量权。整合类比推理有助于法官自己注意最有力的案例。类比推理也便于识别可能的区分原因。因此，它有助于更​​平衡的决策过程。