Discussions of political obligation and authority have focused on the idea that the commands of genuine authorities constitute content-independent reasons. Despite its centrality in these debates, the notion of “content-independence” is unclear and controversial, with some claiming that it is incoherent, useless, or irrelevant. I clarify content-independence by focusing on how reasons can depend on features of their container. I then show how the fact that laws can constitute content-independent reasons is consistent with the fact that some laws must fail to bind due to their egregiously unjust content. Finally, I defend my understanding against challenges and show why it retains a place of special importance for questions about the law and political obligation. Content-independence highlights that it is some feature of the law or law-making process in general that is supposed to generate moral obligations for citizens, not the merits of particular laws.

中文翻译：

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捍卫内容独立性

对政治义务和权威的讨论集中在真正权威的命令构成独立于内容的理由这一观点上。尽管在这些辩论中处于中心地位，但“内容独立性”的概念并不明确且存在争议，有些人声称它是不连贯的、无用的或不相关的。我通过关注原因如何依赖于其容器的特性来阐明内容独立性。然后，我展示了法律可以构成独立于内容的理由这一事实与某些法律由于其极其不公正的内容而必须无法约束的事实是如何一致的。最后，我为自己的理解辩护以应对挑战，并说明为什么它在有关法律和政治义务的问题上仍具有特殊重要性。