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REASONABLE DOUBT AND DISAGREEMENT
Legal Theory Pub Date : 2018-01-09 , DOI: 10.1017/s1352325217000180
Youngjae Lee

The right to trial by jury and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt are two of the most fundamental commitments of American criminal law. This article asks how the two are related, that is, whether disagreement among jurors implies anything about whether the beyond a reasonable doubt standard has been satisfied: Does the due process requirement of the beyond a reasonable doubt standard also require jury unanimity in criminal cases? Drawing on literature about the epistemological significance of disagreement, this article considers the “equal-weight view” and its implications for the unanimity rule in criminal jury decision-making. The equal-weight view says that, roughly speaking, when people disagree on a topic, each view should be given equal weight. This implies, this article concludes, that the unanimity rule is required as a way of enforcing the beyond a reasonable doubt requirement. This article further concludes, however, that jurors should not always be instructed to apply the equal-weight view in their deliberation. Jurors, when applying crime definitions to particular cases, make determinations about both historical facts and normative issues through moral terms like “reckless,” “unjustifiable,” “depraved,” “cruel,” and “heinous,” which are common in criminal law. This article argues that while the equal-weight view should guide the jurors in determining factual issues, it is not the correct model for moral issues, not only because it would imply that acquittals are appropriate in many cases involving controversial moral questions but also because having the jurors follow it would undermine the basic justification for having the criminal jury as an articulator and enforcer of morality.

中文翻译:

合理的怀疑和分歧

陪审团审判权和排除合理怀疑的证据要求是美国刑法最基本的两项承诺。本文探讨两者之间的关系,即陪审员之间的分歧是否意味着排除合理怀疑标准是否得到满足:在刑事案件中,排除合理怀疑标准的正当程序要求是否也需要陪审团一致同意?本文借鉴关于分歧的认识论意义的文献,考虑“平等观点”及其对刑事陪审团决策中一致规则的影响。等权观点是说,粗略地说,当人们在一个话题上存在分歧时,每个观点都应该被赋予同等的权重。这意味着,本文得出结论,一致同意规则是执行排除合理怀疑要求的一种方式。然而,本文进一步得出结论,不应总是指示陪审员在他们的审议中应用同等权重的观点。陪审员在将犯罪定义应用于特定案件时,通过刑法中常见的“鲁莽”、“无理”、“堕落”、“残忍”和“令人发指”等道德术语来确定历史事实和规范问题。 . 本文认为,虽然同等权重的观点应该指导陪审员确定事实问题,但它不是道德问题的正确模式,
更新日期:2018-01-09
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