Following a lengthy process, including two consultations among members and a round table convened by the US Treasury staff in 2013, focused on minimizing the risks of market dislocations such as those associated with Argentina’s prolonged restructuring, the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) in August 2014 published, and then in May 2015 revised, standard form collective action clauses (CACs). While the provisions contain three options for addressing the problem of holdout creditors in sovereign debt restructurings as described in more detail below, the ‘single limb’ voting option is the most innovative and could be the provision that has the most lasting impact on future sovereign debt restructurings. The theory behind the single-limb option is that it materially raises the cost of becoming a holdout creditor in a sovereign debt restructuring thereby allowing issuers and other investors to better manage sovereign restructurings and providing an increased level of predictability. In addition to endorsement by the International Monetary Fund Key points

中文翻译：

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集体行动条款：阿根廷诉讼如何改变主权债务市场

经过漫长的过程，包括成员之间的两次磋商和美国财政部工作人员于 2013 年召集的圆桌会议，其重点是尽量减少市场混乱的风险，例如与阿根廷长期重组相关的风险，国际资本市场协会 (ICMA) 于 8 月2014 年发布，然后在 2015 年 5 月修订了标准形式的集体行动条款 (CAC)。虽然这些条款包含解决主权债务重组中坚持债权人问题的三个选项，如下文更详细描述的，“单边”投票选项是最具创新性的，可能是对未来主权债务产生最持久影响的条款重组。单边期权背后的理论是，它实质上提高了成为主权债务重组中的债权人的成本，从而使发行人和其他投资者能够更好地管理主权重组并提供更高水平的可预测性。除了国际货币基金组织的背书 要点