Money laundering is not a victimless crime. Under certain circumstances, it may lead to significant criminal violence. We analyze the specific case of money laundering in local economies. Criminal organizations invest dirty money in legal local businesses, which may lead to short-term improvements in the economy that benefit the population. Authorities with access to local information may (purposely) fail to report suspicious economic activities to specialized agencies in charge of money laundering because it is politically and economically convenient. The economic windfall generated from illicit money can eventually attract additional criminal organizations to the community, or may fragment the dominant criminal organization, endogenously increasing violence. The violence generated in no way compensates the previous economic growth. We develop theoretical insights on the conditions under which this mechanism exists, and empirically test its incidence and the magnitude of its effects, using Mexican municipalities as units of analysis.

洗钱不是没有受害者的犯罪。在某些情况下，它可能导致重大的刑事暴力。我们分析了当地经济中洗钱的具体案例。犯罪组织将脏钱投资于合法的当地企业，这可能会导致经济的短期改善，从而使民众受益。有权获得当地信息的当局可能（故意）不向负责洗钱的专门机构报告可疑的经济活动，因为这在政治和经济上都方便。非法资金产生的经济意外之财最终会吸引更多的犯罪组织进入社区，或者可能会分散占主导地位的犯罪组织，从而内生地增加暴力。所产生的暴力绝不会补偿之前的经济增长。