The natural consequence of finding an infringement of Article 102 TFEU is to offset the harm to consumer welfare by restoring competition through effective remedies. As big data constitutes the most vital resource in data-driven markets, a dominant undertaking can exclude its rivals from accessing user data and thus deprive them of scale in markets that are characterised by network effects. Indeed, the European Commission found Google guilty of excluding its rivals in the Android licensing case by adopting this strategy. It is, however, unclear as to which remedy can most efficiently restore competition in such cases. This paper analyses the viability of mandatory data sharing as a remedy to restore competition in the affected market. The paper approaches this research question from both theoretical and practical standpoints. First, it analyses the viability of mandatory data sharing remedy from legal, economic and, technological perspective, followed by an assessment of such a remedy within the framework of the GDPR. Based on this comprehensive investigation, it concludes that mandatory data sharing is not the optimal solution to remedy loss to consumer welfare. In view of this, reliance can be placed on other behavioural and structural remedies.

中文翻译：

---

数据驱动市场中的排他性行为：数据共享补救措施的局限性

认定违反第 102 条 TFEU 的自然后果是通过有效补救措施恢复竞争来抵消对消费者福利的损害。由于大数据是数据驱动市场中最重要的资源，占主导地位的企业可以将其竞争对手排除在访问用户数据之外，从而剥夺他们在具有网络效应特征的市场中的规模。事实上，欧盟委员会认定谷歌在 Android 许可案中通过采用这种策略将其竞争对手排除在外。然而，在这种情况下，哪种补救措施可以最有效地恢复竞争尚不清楚。本文分析了强制数据共享作为恢复受影响市场竞争的补救措施的可行性。本文从理论和实践的角度来解决这个研究问题。第一的，它从法律、经济和技术角度分析强制性数据共享补救措施的可行性，然后在 GDPR 框架内评估此类补救措施。基于这项综合调查，它得出结论，强制数据共享不是弥补消费者福利损失的最佳解决方案。有鉴于此，可以依赖其他行为和结构补救措施。