When competition authorities struggle to assess abusive practices by online multi-sided platforms, the issue does not appear to be defining markets or determining market power; rather, the difficulty is finding a fitting theory of abuse. In the search for such theories, one candidate has been overlooked: margin squeeze. This infringement has for the most part been confined to the telecom sector, but its potential reaches beyond. Indeed, the conduct of online platforms could force margin squeeze out of retirement. This article starts from the foundations of margin squeeze theory, laying out the core principles and addressing possible misconceptions. The article then investigates whether margin squeeze theory could be applied to online platforms with the help of three case studies (involving app stores, search engines and online marketplaces). Before concluding, it contemplates the idea of neutrality underlying margin squeeze and related policies such as network neutrality.

中文翻译：

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在线平台和垂直整合：利润挤压的回归？

当竞争管理机构努力评估在线多边平台的滥用行为时，问题似乎并不在于定义市场或确定市场力量；相反，困难在于找到合适的虐待理论。在寻找此类理论的过程中，一个候选人被忽略了：利润率挤压。这种侵权行为在很大程度上仅限于电信行业，但其潜力却远不止于此。事实上，在线平台的行为可能会迫使利润率从退休中挤出。本文从利润挤压理论的基础开始，阐述核心原则并解决可能的误解。然后，文章借助三个案例研究（涉及应用商店、搜索引擎和在线市场）调查了利润挤压理论是否可以应用于在线平台。