Precise international metrics and assessments may induce governments to alter policies in pursuit of more favorable assessments according to these metrics. In this paper, we explore a secondary effect of global performance indicators (GPIs). Insofar as governments have finite resources and make trade-offs in public goods investments, a GPI that precisely targets the provision of a particular public good may cause governments to substitute away from the provision of other, related, public goods. We argue that both the main effect of the GPI (on the measured public good) and this substitution effect vary systematically based on the domestic political institutions and informational environments of targeted states. Specifically, we contend that both the main and substitution effects of GPIs should be largest for governments that are least accountable (opaque and nondemocratic) and should be smallest for those that are most accountable. We illustrate the logic of these arguments using a formal model and test these claims using data on primary and secondary enrollment rates across 114 countries. We find that countries substitute toward primary education enrollment rates (which is targeted by the Millennium Development Goals) and away from secondary (which is not), and that these effects are mitigated as accountability rises.

中文翻译：

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千年发展目标与教育：全球评估中的问责与替代

精确的国际指标和评估可能会促使政府根据这些指标改变政策以寻求更有利的评估。在本文中，我们探讨了全球绩效指标 (GPI) 的次要影响。只要政府拥有有限的资源并在公共产品投资方面进行权衡，一个精确针对特定公共产品提供的 GPI 可能会导致政府替代提供其他相关的公共产品。我们认为，基于目标国家的国内政治制度和信息环境，GPI（对衡量的公共产品）的主要影响和这种替代效应都会系统地变化。具体来说，我们认为，GPI 的主要和替代效应对于最不负责任（不透明和非民主）的政府应该是最大的，而对于那些最负责任的政府来说应该是最小的。我们使用正式模型说明这些论点的逻辑，并使用 114 个国家的小学和中学入学率数据来检验这些说法。我们发现，各国以小学教育入学率（千年发展目标的目标）替代中学（不是），并且随着问责制的提高，这些影响得到缓解。