ABSTRACT

The emerging consensus in the secondary literature on Duhem is that his notion of ‘good sense’ is a virtue of individual scientists that guides them choosie between empirically equal rival theories (Stump 2007 Stump, D. 2007. “Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38: 149–159.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Pierre Duhem’s Virtue Epistemology.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 38 (1): 149–159; Ivanova 2010 Ivanova, M. 2010. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41: 58–64.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “Pierre Duhem’s Good Sense as a Guide to Theory Choice.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (1): 58–64; Fairweather 2011 Fairweather, A. 2011. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43: 139–146.[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]. “The Epistemic Value of Good Sense.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 139–146; Bhakthavatsalam (2017 Bhakthavatsalam, S. 2017. “Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64: 22–29.[Crossref], [PubMed], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). “Duhemian Good Sense and Agent Reliabilism.” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 64: 22–29). In this paper, I argue that good sense is irrelevant for theory choice within Duhem’s conception of scientific methodology. Theory choice, for Duhem, is either a pseudo-problem or addressed purely by empirical and formal desiderata depending on how it is understood. I go on to provide a positive interpretation of good sense as a feature of scientific communities that undergo particular forms of education that allow scientists to abandon theory pursuit. I conclude by suggesting that this interpretation entails that virtue epistemological readings of Duhem are insufficient for understanding good sense; we must employ a social epistemological perspective.

摘要

关于杜希姆（Duhem）的二手文献中正在出现的共识是，他的“明智”概念是个体科学家的一项美德，可以指导他们在经验上相等的竞争者理论之间进行选择（Stump 2007）。 Stump，D.， 2007年。“ Pierre Duhem的美德认识论。” 历史与科学哲学研究A部分38：149 – 159。[Crossref]，[Web ofScience®]， [Google Scholar]。“ Pierre Duhem的美德认识论”。历史与科学哲学研究A部分38（1）：149–159; 伊万诺娃2010 伊万诺娃，M. 2010。“ Pierre Duhem的善感，是理论选择的指南。” 在研究科学史与科学A部分的哲学41：58 - 64。[Crossref]，[PubMed]，[Web ofScience®]， [Google Scholar]。“ Pierre Duhem的善意引导了理论选择。” 历史学和科学哲学研究A部分41（1）：58–64; 2011年Fairweather Fairweather，A.， 2011年。“感官的认识论价值。” 历史和科学哲学研究A部分43：139 – 146。[Crossref]，[Web ofScience®]， [Google Scholar]。“明智的认识论价值。” 历史和科学哲学研究A部分43（1）：139–146; Bhakthavatsalam（2017 Bhakthavatsalam，S. 2017年。“ Duhemian的良好意识和特工信赖度。” 在研究科学史与科学A部分的哲学64：22 - 29。[Crossref]，[PubMed]，[Web of Science®]， [Google Scholar]）。“ Duhemian的良好意识和特工信赖度。” 历史与科学哲学研究A64：22–29）。在本文中，我认为，在杜hem的科学方法论概念内，合理的选择与理论选择无关。对于Duhem而言，理论选择要么是一个伪问题，要么纯粹是根据对它的理解，通过经验和形式要求来解决。我将继续对良好的感觉做出积极的解释，这是经过特殊形式的教育，允许科学家放弃理论追求的科学共同体的一个特征。最后，我建议，这种解释意味着，对Duhem的美德认识论解读不足以理解良好的感觉。我们必须运用社会认识论的观点。