We examine the market reaction to a sample of firms following the announcement of the firms' involvement in fraud, referred to as the trigger event. We find that these firms experience negative and significant returns following the announcement of fraud, in contrast to a control sample. More importantly, we examine tactics, such as changes in executives, auditing firm, and company name, that these firms may use to regain the market's confidence. We find that the market reacts negatively right after the change in executives, but the negative trend is reversed in the long-term for firms that make an executive change quickly after the trigger event. Similarly, firms that quickly change their auditing firm fare better. We also find that there is significantly more information asymmetry during the trigger event and at the litigation date, as well as during changes in CEO, CFO, and auditor. We find a prompt change in CFO is positively and significantly related to, and therefore predicts, better long-term stock performance.

在宣布公司参与欺诈（称为触发事件）之后，我们研究了市场对公司样本的反应。我们发现，与控制样本相比，这些公司在宣布欺诈后会遭受负面和重大的回报。更重要的是，我们将研究这些公司可能用来重新获得市场信心的策略，例如高管，审计公司和公司名称的变更。我们发现，在高管变更后市场立即做出负面反应，但长期而言，对于那些在触发事件后迅速进行高管变更的公司而言，这种负面趋势是可以逆转的。同样，快速更换其审计公司的公司的表现也更好。我们还发现，在触发事件期间和诉讼日期以及首席执行官，首席财务官和审计师变更期间，存在明显更多的信息不对称。我们发现，首席财务官的及时改变与长期股票的业绩有正向显着的关系，因此可以预测长期的股票业绩会更好。