The literature shows that the performance of bidders has been historically poor both in the short run and in the long run. Agency theory tells us that unless CEO owns 100% of the firm, the decision-making process would deviate from shareholder value maximization. Building upon the theory of internal governance by Acharya et al. (J Financ 66(3):689–720, 2011), this study documents the salutary effect of the novel governance mechanism on corporate acquisition activities. Internal governance is optimal if neither the CEO nor her subordinates are dominating. The curvilinear relationship suggests that when power and responsibility sharing is balanced in acquiring firms, myopic CEOs would have lower acquisition propensity, lower likelihood of targeting public firms, higher deal completion rate, and stronger short term gains. A system of regression equations is applied to mitigate the concerns about potential endogeneity and selection bias. Moreover, the empirical evidence demonstrates that good internal governance has strong predictive power for long term performance in the post-acquisition period, which sheds light on the influential role of subordinates in post-deal integration.

文献表明，无论从短期还是从长期来看，投标人的表现一直很差。代理理论告诉我们，除非首席执行官拥有公司100％的股权，否则决策过程将偏离股东价值最大化。基于Acharya等人的内部治理理论。（J Financ 66（3）：689–720，2011），该研究记录了新型治理机制对公司收购活动的有益影响。如果首席执行官及其下属均未占主导地位，则内部治理是最佳选择。曲线关系表明，当兼并公司中的权力和责任分担达到平衡时，近视首席执行官将具有更低的并购倾向，更低的目标对象为上市公司，更高的交易完成率以及更强的短期收益。应用回归方程组来减轻对潜在内生性和选择偏见的担忧。此外，经验证据表明，良好的内部治理对于收购后的长期业绩具有很强的预测力，这揭示了下属在交易整合后的影响力。