Privity is generally understood as a rule comprising a burdens limb and a more controversial benefits or ‘rights’ limb. This rendition of privity is too simplistic. Privity has multiple aspects, but its underlying complexity has been obscured by an overwhelming focus on ‘rights’, explaining in part the persistent unclarity plaguing the area. In this article, I argue that an elision of concepts has hampered our understanding of privity and its reform. The literature on contractual rights to performance and secondary rights to damages for their breach is legion. By contrast, standing, as a separate and distinct concept, has been overlooked. These are concepts that need to be more clearly differentiated. While not a panacea to resolve all issues, it is a necessary step to a firmer handle over the distinct issues at stake, and to opening up a novel angle to privity reform—third-party standing—the road not taken.

中文翻译：

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隐私权：权利、地位和未选择的道路

隐私权通常被理解为包括负担部分和更具争议性的利益或“权利”部分的规则。这种对隐私的诠释过于简单化了。隐私有多个方面，但其潜在的复杂性已被对“权利”的压倒性关注所掩盖，部分解释了困扰该地区的持续不明朗因素。在本文中，我认为概念的省略妨碍了我们对隐私及其改革的理解。关于履行合同的权利和因违约而获得损害赔偿的次要权利的文献不胜枚举。相比之下，站立作为一个独立而独特的概念却被忽视了。这些是需要更清楚地区分的概念。虽然不是解决所有问题的灵丹妙药，但它是更坚定地处理相关问题的必要步骤，