Recent results have challenged the widespread assumption of dual process models of belief bias that sound reasoning relies on slow, careful reflection, whereas biased reasoning is based on fast intuition. Instead, parallel process models of reasoning suggest that rule- and belief-based problem features are processed in parallel and that reasoning problems that elicit a conflict between rule- and belief-based problem features may also elicit more than one Type 1 response. This has important implications for individual-differences research on reasoning, because rule-based responses by certain individuals may reflect that these individuals were either more likely to give a rule-based default response or that they successfully inhibited and overrode a belief-based default response. In two studies, we used the diffusion model to describe decision making in a transitive reasoning task. In Study 1, 41 participants were asked to evaluate conclusions based on their validity. In Study 2, 133 participants evaluated conclusions based on their validity or believability. We tested which diffusion model parameters reflected conflict resolution and related those model parameters to individual differences in cognitive abilities and thinking styles. Individual differences in need for cognition predicted successful conflict resolution under logic instruction, which suggests that a disposition to engage in reflective thinking facilitates the inhibition and override of Type 1 responses. Intelligence, however, was negatively related to successful conflict resolution under belief instruction, which suggests that individuals with high cognitive abilities quickly generated a higher-level logical response that interfered with their ability to evaluate lower-level intrinsic problem features. Taken together, this double dissociation indicates that cognitive abilities and thinking styles affect the processing of conflict information through different mechanisms and at different stages: Greater cognitive abilities facilitate the efficient creation of decoupled problem representations, whereas a greater disposition to engage in critical thinking facilitates the detection and override of Type 1 responses.

最近的结果挑战了信念偏倚的双重过程模型的普遍假设，即合理的推理依赖于缓慢而认真的反思，而偏见的推理则基于快速的直觉。相反，并行的推理过程模型建议并行处理基于规则和基于信念的问题特征，并且引发基于规则和基于信念的问题特征之间冲突的推理问题也可能引起多个类型1的响应。这对推理方面的个体差异研究具有重要意义，因为某些个体基于规则的响应可能反映出这些个体更有可能给出基于规则的默认响应，或者他们成功地抑制并取代了基于信念的默认响应。在两项研究中 我们使用扩散模型来描述传递推理任务中的决策。在研究1中，要求41名参与者根据其有效性评估结论。在研究2中，有133名参与者根据其有效性或可信度评估了结论。我们测试了哪些扩散模型参数反映了冲突的解决方案，并将这些模型参数与认知能力和思维方式的个体差异相关联。在认知需要上的个体差异预示着在逻辑指导下成功的冲突解决，这表明参与反思性思维的倾向有助于抑制和超越第一类反应。但是，智力与信仰指导下成功解决冲突负相关，这表明具有较高认知能力的人会迅速产生较高水平的逻辑反应，从而干扰他们评估较低水平的内在问题特征的能力。双重分解表明，认知能力和思维方式通过不同的机制和不同的阶段影响冲突信息的处理：认知能力的提高促进了去耦问题表示的有效创建，而批判性思维的更大倾向则促进了解决问题的能力。检测和覆盖类型1响应。