After India's detonation of a nuclear explosive in 1974 publicly demonstrated the proliferation risks from nuclear assistance, the U.S. government increased its efforts to control nuclear exports worldwide. In doing so, U.S. policymakers faced challenges from two major West European allies, France and West Germany, both of which pursued their commercial interests through nuclear exports to countries such as Pakistan, Brazil, Iran, and India, among others. Despite multilateral efforts including the formation of the Nuclear Suppliers Group and bilateral negotiations with the supplier governments, the administrations of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter attained only partial success. The commercial interests of nuclear firms, the influence of pro-export coalitions inside supplier countries, and the emerging importance of the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries as alternative suppliers influenced the outcome. The United States was more successful in restraining the French through a series of quid pro quo arrangements than it ever was with the West Germans. Using recently declassified archival documents, this article sheds new light on U.S. nonproliferation policy in the aftermath of the 1973 oil price shock.

中文翻译：

---

美国遏制西欧核出口的政策，1974-1978

1974 年印度引爆核爆炸，公开表明核援助存在扩散风险后，美国政府加大了对全球核出口的控制力度。在这样做的过程中，美国决策者面临着来自西欧两大盟国法国和西德的挑战，这两个盟国都通过向巴基斯坦、巴西、伊朗和印度等国家出口核来谋求商业利益。尽管进行了多边努力，包括成立核供应国集团以及与供应国政府进行双边谈判，杰拉尔德·福特和吉米·卡特的政府只取得了部分成功。核公司的商业利益，供应国内部亲出口联盟的影响，苏联和其他华沙条约国家作为替代供应商的重要性日益凸显，影响了结果。美国通过一系列交换条件限制法国人比以往任何时候都更成功地限制了西德人。本文使用最近解密的档案文件，对 1973 年石油价格冲击之后的美国核不扩散政策提供了新的启示。