Avicenna's analysis of the definition of substance and accident repeatedly emphasizes two points: one and the same essence cannot be substance in one instance and accident in another; whetherxis extrinsic or intrinsic for an underlying subject,ydoes not tell us anything as to whetherxis substance or not. Both points are development in an argument against certain unnamed people who claimed the opposite. In this article I will show that Avicenna's opponents are to be identified with the mainstream Baghdad Peripatetic School (Ibn Suwār, Ibn al-Ṭayyib) which based itself on the Late Antique rule that “parts of substances are substances”. As for Avicenna's own position, it was developed on the basis of the heterodox position of Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī, who anticipated Avicenna's first point. This is a further piece of evidence for something that has only recently begun to be appreciated: the influence of Ibn ʿAdī on Avicenna.

中文翻译：

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火与热：YAḤYĀ B. ʿADĪ 和 Avicenna 关于物质或事故的本质

阿维森纳对实体和偶然性定义的分析反复强调了两点：同一个本质不能在一个实例中是实体而在另一个实例中是偶然的；无论X对于基础主题而言是外在的或内在的，是的没有告诉我们是否X是实质与否。这两点都是针对某些声称相反的未透露姓名的人的争论中的发展。在本文中，我将表明阿维森纳的反对者将与主流的巴格达逍遥学派（Ibn Suwār，Ibn al-Ṭayyib）认同，该学派基于“物质的一部分是物质”的晚期古董规则。至于阿维森纳自己的立场，则是在 Yaḥyā b 的异端立场的基础上发展起来的。ʿAdī，他预料到了阿维森纳的第一点。这是最近才开始受到重视的另一件事的证据：伊本·阿迪对阿维森纳的影响。