Alongside his much-discussed theory that humans are permanently, if only tacitly, self-aware, Avicenna proposed that in actively conscious self-knowers the subject and object of thought are identical. He applies to both humans and God the slogan that the self-knower is “intellect, intellecting, and object of intellection (‘aql, ‘āqil, ma‘qūl)”. This paper examines reactions to this idea in the Islamic East from the 12th-13th centuries. A wide range of philosophers such as Abū l-Barakāt al-Baghdādī, Faḫr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, al-Šahrastānī, Šaraf al-Dīn al-Mas‘ūdī, al-Abharī, al-Āmidī, and Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī raised and countered objections to Avicenna's position. One central problem was that on widely accepted definitions of knowledge – according to which knowledge is representational or consists in a relation – it seems impossible for the subject and object of knowledge to be the same. Responses to this difficulty included the idea that a self-knower is “present” to itself, or that here subject and object are different only in “aspect (i‘tibār)”.

中文翻译：

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AVICENNA 之后的自知之明

除了他广受讨论的关于人类永远具有自我意识的理论外，阿维森纳还提出，在主动有意识的自我认知者中，思想的主体和对象是相同的。他将自我认识者是“理智、理智和理智的对象”的口号应用于人类和上帝。'aql, 'āqil, ma'qūl)”。本文考察了 12 至 13 世纪伊斯兰东方对这一想法的反应。广泛的哲学家，例如阿布·巴拉卡特·巴格达迪、法哈尔·丁·拉齐、阿尔·沙赫拉斯坦尼、萨拉夫·阿尔丁·马斯'ūdī、al-Abharī、al-Āmidī和Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī 提出并反驳了对阿维森纳立场的反对意见。一个中心问题是，在广泛接受的知识定义中——根据知识是具象性的或存在于关系中的——知识的主体和客体似乎不可能相同。对这一困难的回应包括这样一种观念，即自我认识者是“在场”的，或者这里的主体和客体仅在“方面（伊蒂巴尔)”。