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CEO Pay Components and Aggressive Non-GAAP Earnings Disclosure
Journal of Accounting, Auditing & Finance Pub Date : 2021-02-15 , DOI: 10.1177/0148558x21989907
Dirk E. Black 1 , Ervin L. Black 2 , Theodore E. Christensen 3 , Kurt H. Gee 4
Affiliation  

We examine the relation between CEO pay components and aggressive non-GAAP earnings disclosures using CEO pay components as proxies for managers’ short- versus long-term focus. Specifically, we explore the extent to which short-term bonus plan payouts and long-term incentive plan payouts are associated with: (1) Managers’ propensity to exclude expense items in excess of those excluded by equity analysts; and, (2) The magnitude of those incremental exclusions. We find that long-term incentive plan payouts are negatively associated with the likelihood and magnitude of aggressive non-GAAP exclusions. Our results are consistent with managers reporting non-GAAP information less aggressively when they are more focused on long-term, rather than short-term, value.



中文翻译:

CEO薪酬构成和积极的非GAAP收益披露

我们使用CEO薪酬构成要素作为经理短期和长期关注点的代理,检验了CEO薪酬构成要素与积极的非GAAP收入披露之间的关系。具体而言,我们探讨了短期奖金计划支出和长期激励计划支出与以下程度的关联:(1)管理者倾向于将超出支出项目的费用项目排除在权益分析师之外;(2)这些增量排除的数量。我们发现,长期激励计划支出与积极的非GAAP排除因素的可能性和严重程度负相关。我们的结果与管理人员在更加关注长期而非短期价值时较少主动报告非GAAP信息相一致。

更新日期:2021-02-20
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