This paper analyses the distribution of a priori voting power of states and regional groups within the UN Security Council, under the most salient reform proposals of the past decade. The results obtained show that moderate proposals, which do not seek to expand veto rights, generally yield a higher voting power share for non-veto states in the Council (both individually and collectively), at the expense of veto states, but they do not alter the geographical distribution of voting power significantly. By contrast, the more radical proposals, which seek to expand veto rights, yield a more balanced regional representation, but have the adverse effect of concentrating voting power almost entirely in the hands of the small number of states with veto rights, with non-veto states holding cumulatively less than 2 per cent of all voting power shares in the Security Council under the Normalized Banzhaf index and less than 0.01 per cent under the Shapley-Shubik index.

中文翻译：

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当代安全理事会改革提案下的先验投票权分配

本文分析了在过去十年最显着的改革建议下，联合国安理会内国家和地区集团先验投票权的分布。获得的结果表明，不寻求扩大否决权的温和提案通常会在理事会中为非否决国（单独和集体）产生更高的投票权份额，以否决国为代价，但它们没有显着改变投票权的地理分布。相比之下，寻求扩大否决权的更激进的提案会产生更平衡的区域代表性，但会产生将投票权几乎完全集中在少数拥有否决权的国家手中的不利影响，