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Designing Financial Supervision: The Puzzling Case of the FIUs against Money Laundering
Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2016-03-01 , DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjw002
Donato Masciandaro , Alessio Volpicella

The design of financial supervision for the purposes of implementing anti-money laundering (AML) regulation has become essential in the agendas of governments. This AML regulation has been implemented through the creation of specialized agencies known as Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs). The establishment of FIUs was triggered by international pressures exerted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which at the same time leaves any country free to choose its preferred model. A crucial question thus arises: how do the policymakers select their FIU models? The economics of AML suggests that a financial model of FIU (FFIU) should be the best choice, given its comparative informational advantages. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis of the establishment of FIUs shows a more nuanced reality: after the September 11 terrorist attack, the policymakers preferred the Law Enforcement model of Financial Intelligence Unit (LEFIU). Using a political economy framework, two possible and non-alternative explanations are offered. In order to counteract the terrorist threat, policymakers could have preferred the comparative advantages of the LEFIU model in terms of police and investigation powers. At the same time, politicians could have used September 11 just as an occasion to avoid the establishment of a FFIU with its higher risks of banking capture and/or an over-powerful financial agency.

中文翻译:

设计金融监管:金融情报机构反对洗钱的令人困惑的案例

为实施反洗钱(AML)法规而设计的财务监管已经在政府议程中变得至关重要。通过建立称为金融情报部门(FIU)的专门机构来实施反洗钱条例。金融情报工作组的建立是由金融行动工作组(FATF)施加的国际压力触发的,同时,任何国家都可以自由选择其首选模式。因此,出现了一个关键问题:决策者如何选择他们的金融情报机构模型?AML的经济学建议,鉴于FIU的比较信息优势,其财务模型应该是最佳选择。尽管如此,我们对金融情报机构的建立进行的实证分析显示出更为细微的现实:在9月11日的恐怖袭击之后,政策制定者偏爱金融情报部门(LEFIU)的执法模式。使用政治经济学框架,提供了两种可能的和非替代的解释。为了应对恐怖威胁,政策制定者本可以在警察和调查权方面偏爱LEFIU模型的比较优势。同时,政客本来可以利用9月11日为时机,避免建立金融情报机构(FFIU),因为金融情报局具有较高的银行业控制风险和/或实力雄厚的金融机构。就警察和调查权力而言,政策制定者本来可以选择LEFIU模型的比较优势。同时,政客本来可以利用9月11日为时机,避免建立金融情报机构(FFIU),因为金融情报局具有较高的银行业控制风险和/或实力雄厚的金融机构。就警察和调查权力而言,政策制定者本来可以选择LEFIU模型的比较优势。同时,政客本来可以利用9月11日为时机,避免建立金融情报机构(FFIU),因为金融情报局具有较高的银行业控制风险和/或实力雄厚的金融机构。
更新日期:2016-03-01
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