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Inaction in Macro-prudential Supervision: Assessing the EU’s Response
Journal of Financial Regulation Pub Date : 2019-03-01 , DOI: 10.1093/jfr/fjz001
Pierre Schammo 1
Affiliation  

In the macro-prudential literature, ‘inaction bias’ describes the supposed tendency of macro-prudential actors to favour inaction over action when considering the use of macro-prudential tools. While inaction bias is a topic of much interest in macro-prudential policy circles, it has received scant attention from legal scholarship. The aim of this article is to contribute to filling this gap by studying inaction in an EU macro-prudential context and by evaluating the institutional arrangements that were put in place in order to address so-called inaction bias. Several actors at the EU level have a role to play in macro-prudential supervision, especially the European Systemic Risk Board and the European Central Bank (ECB). This paper will assess their capabilities and their capacity to turn these into actions. The role of the ECB will be of particular interest since it was vested with real powers to address possible inaction bias among states participating in the Banking Union. Among other things, I will examine whether the ECB’s macro-prudential powers are the cure to the problems that are said to underpin inaction bias at the national level.

中文翻译:

宏观审慎监管无所作为:评估欧盟的回应

在宏观审慎的文献中,“不作为偏见”描述了当考虑使用宏观审慎工具时,宏观审慎参与者偏向于不采取行动的假定趋势。无所作为的偏见是宏观审慎政策界非常感兴趣的话题,但它却很少受到法律学者的关注。本文的目的是通过研究欧盟宏观审慎背景下的不作为并评估为解决所谓的不作为偏见而制定的制度安排,为填补这一空白做出贡献。欧盟一级的一些参与者在宏观审慎监管中可以发挥作用,尤其是欧洲系统性风险委员会和欧洲中央银行(ECB)。本文将评估他们的能力以及将其转化为行动的能力。欧洲央行的作用将特别令人关注,因为它拥有解决参与银行联盟的国家之间可能的不作为偏见的真正权力。除其他事项外,我将研究欧洲央行的宏观审慎权力是否能够解决据说在国家一级加剧不作为偏见的问题。
更新日期:2019-03-01
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