Using Regulation SHO as natural experiment, we find that work-related injury and illness rates increase significantly at treated firms relative to the control group. The effect is more pronounced for firms in more competitive industries, firms in which labor has low negotiating power with management, and those that are more financially constrained or with poor corporate governance. Further, this effect is not explained by salient firm performance characteristics and is stronger for firms whose stock returns are less sensitive to injury rates. Overall, the results shed light on how capital market frictions impact firms’ investment in workplace safety.

中文翻译：

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资本市场摩擦和人力资本投资：围绕法规SHO的工作场所安全的证据

使用SHO法规作为自然实验，我们发现，与对照组相比，已处理企业的工伤和疾病发病率显着增加。对于竞争更激烈的行业中的公司，劳动力与管理层的谈判能力低的公司以及财务上受到约束或公司治理不佳的公司，这种影响更为明显。此外，这种影响不能用突出的公司绩效特征来解释，而对于股票收益对损害率较不敏感的公司则更为明显。总体而言，结果揭示了资本市场摩擦如何影响企业对工作场所安全的投资。