Abstract JobBridge, the Irish National Internship Scheme, was a labour activation measure launched in July 2011, during a period of extreme economic crisis, and was marketed as a chance for young people to gain career experience in quality work placements. Over 60 per cent of participants found employment after leaving the scheme but it suffered from high deadweight losses and was widely criticised as exploitative during its existence. This was quite predictable, which leaves the puzzle as to why JobBridge was designed without more regulations to protect the entry-level jobs market and the interests of the unemployed? This paper will trace the processes behind this suboptimal decision-making. First, it will show the institutional factors influencing poor policy decisions on labour activation. Then it will explain the main incentives behind an under-regulated programme, which were the need to develop a workable scheme as quickly as possible and to do this without significant funding. Finally, it will show how the decision-making process prioritised the interests of the Labour Party, government, business and the concerned parents of unemployed youth over the interests of the unemployed.

中文翻译：

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无处可去的工作桥梁：国家实习计划作为导致糟糕政策的快速政策

摘要 JobBridge 是爱尔兰国家实习计划，是 2011 年 7 月在极度经济危机时期推出的一项劳动力激活措施，旨在为年轻人提供在优质工作实习中获得职业经验的机会。超过 60% 的参与者在退出该计划后找到了工作，但它遭受了高额的无谓损失，并且在其存在期间被广泛批评为剥削性的。这是完全可以预见的，这让人困惑，为什么JobBridge的设计没有更多的法规来保护入门级就业市场和失业者的利益？本文将追溯这种次优决策背后的过程。首先，它将展示影响劳动力激活的不良政策决策的制度因素。然后，它将解释监管不足的计划背后的主要动机，即需要尽快制定可行的计划，并且无需大量资金即可实现。最后，它将展示决策过程如何将工党、政府、企业和失业青年的有关父母的利益置于失业者的利益之上。