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DISCLOSURE DECISION IN AN ENTRY GAME WITH COSTLY INFORMATION INTERPRETATION
Global Economy Journal Pub Date : 2019-04-08 , DOI: 10.1142/s2194565919500052 EDA ORHUN 1
Global Economy Journal Pub Date : 2019-04-08 , DOI: 10.1142/s2194565919500052 EDA ORHUN 1
Affiliation
This paper analyzes a firm’s incentives to disclose private information related to its market situation when there is a potential competitor. However, I adopt a more realistic definition of transparency that has been mostly overlooked by the earlier literature. In a realistic situation, financial transparency does not imply that all the relevant information are automatically transmitted to the receiver of the signal but instead the available information needs to be understood. When the model is adjusted to incorporate this realistic definition of transparency, fully revealing equilibrium associated with the “Revelation Principle” does not exist anymore. It is observed that the model with interpretation costs of transparency yields both pooling and partially pooling equilibria.
中文翻译:
信息解释成本高昂的入门游戏中的披露决策
本文分析了当存在潜在竞争者时公司披露与其市场状况相关的私人信息的动机。然而,我采用了一个更现实的透明度定义,这在早期的文献中大多被忽视了。在现实情况下,财务透明度并不意味着所有相关信息都会自动传输到信号接收者,而是需要了解可用信息。当模型被调整以包含透明度的这种现实定义时,与“启示原则”相关的完全揭示的平衡不再存在。可以观察到,具有透明度解释成本的模型会产生池化和部分池化均衡。
更新日期:2019-04-08
中文翻译:
信息解释成本高昂的入门游戏中的披露决策
本文分析了当存在潜在竞争者时公司披露与其市场状况相关的私人信息的动机。然而,我采用了一个更现实的透明度定义,这在早期的文献中大多被忽视了。在现实情况下,财务透明度并不意味着所有相关信息都会自动传输到信号接收者,而是需要了解可用信息。当模型被调整以包含透明度的这种现实定义时,与“启示原则”相关的完全揭示的平衡不再存在。可以观察到,具有透明度解释成本的模型会产生池化和部分池化均衡。