We explore how the nature of the screening technology and the organization of the submission system affect the screening incentives of competing journals. We characterize the effect of market structure on screening by comparing a duopoly with a monopoly in the journal market. Exclusivity requirements for submissions induce more screening than systems with parallel submission. With sequential submissions, competition between journals induces adverse selection effects, whereby the average quality of the pool of submissions is degraded in response to acceptance of high-quality manuscripts. We outline how information exchange between journals impact on this adverse selection mechanism.

我们探索筛选技术的性质和提交系统的组织如何影响竞争期刊的筛选动机。我们通过比较期刊市场上的双头垄断与垄断来表征市场结构对筛选的影响。与平行提交的系统相比，提交的排他性要求引起了更多的筛选。对于顺序投稿，期刊之间的竞争会产生不利的选拔效应，从而随着对高质量手稿的接受，投稿库的平均质量下降。我们概述了期刊之间的信息交流如何影响这种逆向选择机制。