The basic “simple rules” thesis holds that most legal relationships can be reduced to questions of autonomy, property acquisition, contract and tort on the private law side, and eminent domain and taxation on the public law side. This paper extends that analysis in three directions. First, it explains how a single-owner model drives this basic set of entitlements under conditions of universal consent, which are not matched in a state of nature. It then explains how when property rights derive from occupation instead of common ownership, a simplified set of entitlements offers the best path for incorporating the basic insights of the single-owner model. When, however, one or more parties deviate from these entitlements, the needed remedial adjustments typically must overcome uncertainty in trying to choose the proper mix of damages and specific relief in varying contexts. Once that private law framework is settled, the paper then identifies the central rule that governs the switch from private to public law: efficient entitlements should never be altered, but that new remedial design should improve the private law model by reducing the transactions costs needed to operate the overall system.

基本的“简单规则”论点认为，大多数法律关系可以简化为私法方面的自治，财产获取，合同和侵权问题，以及公法方面的显着领域和税收问题。本文从三个方向扩展了该分析。首先，它解释了单所有者模型如何在普遍同意的条件下驱动这组基本权利，而这些权利在自然状态下是不匹配的。然后，它解释了当产权是从占领而非普通所有权衍生而来的时，一套简化的权利为合并单所有者模型的基本见解提供了最佳途径。但是，当一个或多个当事方偏离这些权利时，所需的补救措施调整通常必须克服不确定性，以便在不同情况下选择适当的损害赔偿和特定救济组合。一旦解决了私法框架，本文便确定了控制从私法向公法转变的中央规则：有效权利不应改变，但新的补救性设计应通过减少交易成本来改善私法模式。操作整个系统。