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Low-carbonization game analysis and optimization in a two-echelon supply chain under the carbon-tax policy
Journal of Chinese Economic and Foreign Trade Studies Pub Date : 2016-06-06 , DOI: 10.1108/jcefts-11-2015-0029
Shihui Yang , Jun Yu

Purpose - The conclusions are useful when enterprises make decisions under the policy of carbon-tax. Design/methodology/approach - Based on the carbon-tax policy, with the consideration of consumers’ low-carbon preferences, this paper compares the pricing, emission reducing and advertising decisions in three different games (one centralized game, two decentralized Stackelberg games). Findings - This paper concludes that, through centralized game, namely, cooperation game, manufacturer, retailer and consumers can reach their optimal situation. In the numerical simulation, this paper analyzes the impact of carbon-tax rate to the decisions of manufacturer and retailer, as well as their profit. Originality/value - By using the Nash bargaining model, the introduction of the bargaining power and the degree of risk aversion of the parties, this study provides some solution for the distribution of the additional profit when they cooperate, in which way they can reach their Pareto Optimality.

中文翻译:

碳税政策下两级供应链的低碳化博弈分析与优化

目的-结论在企业根据碳税政策做出决策时很有用。设计/方法/方法-基于碳税政策,考虑到消费者的低碳偏好,本文比较了三种不同游戏(一个集中式游戏,两个去中心化Stackelberg游戏)的定价,减排和广告决策。调查结果-本文得出的结论是,通过集中式博弈,即合作博弈,制造商,零售商和消费者可以达到自己的最佳状态。在数值模拟中,本文分析了碳税率对制造商和零售商的决策及其利润的影响。独创性/价值-通过使用Nash讨价还价模型,讨价还价能力的引入以及各方的风险规避程度,
更新日期:2016-06-06
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