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Can non-CEO inside directors add value? Evidence from unplanned CEO turnovers
Review of Accounting and Finance Pub Date : 2019-08-12 , DOI: 10.1108/raf-06-2018-0111
Laurie Krigman , Mia L. Rivolta

A firm’s ability to quickly recover from setbacks is of great importance to its stakeholders and investors. Although critics argue that inside directors decrease the monitoring effectiveness of a board, inside directors arguably possess superior firm specific experience and knowledge. The main purpose of this paper is to investigate the roles of non-CEO inside directors using the context of sudden CEO departures when immediate CEO succession planning is of great importance. Using a unique data set of 351 sudden CEO departures from 1993 to 2009, we find evidence that firms with non-CEO inside directors face fewer disruption costs and have superior performance following the change in CEO, especially when the firm hires an outsider as the new CEO.

中文翻译:

非首席执行官内部董事能否增加价值?计划外CEO流动的证据

公司从挫折中快速恢复的能力对它的利益相关者和投资者至关重要。尽管批评家认为内部董事会降低董事会的监督效率,但内部董事可以说拥有丰富的公司特定经验和知识。本文的主要目的是,在立即执行CEO继任计划非常重要的情况下,使用突然离任的CEO来研究非CEO在董事内部的作用。使用从1993年到2009年的351个CEO突然离职的独特数据集,我们发现有证据表明,具有非CEO内部董事的公司在CEO更换后面临更少的破坏成本,并且表现更好,特别是当公司雇用外部人员作为新公司时首席执行官。
更新日期:2019-08-12
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