The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of competition in financial markets on the frequency of portfolio disclosures by mutual funds and its implications for consumer search costs.,The empirical analysis merges the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) survivorship bias-free mutual fund database, the Thompson Financial CDA/ Spectrum holdings database and the CRSP stock price data. The sample covers the time period between 1993 and 2010 and OLS and logistic regressions are used to investigate the impact of competition on fund disclosures.,This paper finds that mutual fund disclosures decrease with market competition and this effect is amplified for funds holding illiquid assets. These results provide empirical support for the findings of Carlin et al. (2102). Mutual funds use portfolio disclosures as a marketing tool to attract investments in a tournament-like market, where superior relative performance and greater visibility are rewarded with convex payoffs. With competition, the likelihood of receiving new investments decreases for each fund and funds respond by reducing costly voluntary disclosures. The disclosure costs are higher for funds holding illiquid assets, and hence, the effect is stronger for them.,This paper has important policy implications for disclosures in a market where relative performance matters. The traditional view is that competition induces voluntary disclosure because entities would like to differentiate themselves from competitors, and hence, competition should increase market transparency. However, this paper sheds light on the negative consequence of competition in a tournament-like mutual fund market.

中文翻译：

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竞争对基金披露和消费者搜寻成本的影响

本文的目的是调查金融市场竞争对共同基金投资组合披露频率的影响及其对消费者搜寻成本的影响。实证分析将证券价格研究中心（CRSP）生存偏差归纳为免费的共同基金数据库，汤普森金融CDA / Spectrum持股数据库和CRSP股票价格数据。该样本涵盖了1993年至2010年之间的时间段，并使用OLS和Logistic回归研究竞争对基金披露的影响。本文发现，共同基金披露随着市场竞争而减少，而持有非流动性资产的基金则扩大了这种影响。这些结果为卡林等人的发现提供了经验支持。（2102）。互惠基金使用投资组合披露作为一种营销工具来吸引类似锦标赛的市场中的投资，在这种市场中，出色的相对表现和更大的知名度可通过凸出的回报获得回报。在竞争的情况下，每个基金获得新投资的可能性都会降低，并且基金会通过减少昂贵的自愿披露来做出回应。持有非流动资产的基金的披露成本较高，因此对它们的影响更大。本文对相对业绩至关重要的市场中的披露具有重要的政策含义。传统观点认为，竞争会导致自愿披露，因为实体希望将自己与竞争者区分开来，因此，竞争应增加市场透明度。然而，