Asymmetric information and lack of collateral creates a suboptimal allocation of financial resources to those in most need. When uncollateralised borrowers approach financial institutions, the presence of moral hazard and adverse selection results in no lending. Conversely, group‐lending contracts—joint liability, dynamic lending, and social cost for defaulting—control for information asymmetries and create a co‐operative trust game between borrowers leading to an undominated optimal strategy to repay, and therefore, for the lender to Give. Group lending proves superior to typical individual borrowing and lending when no collateral is available. Social collateral and trust are fundamental pieces of the successful work of MicroFinance. Resulting contracts and correspondent payoffs are Pareto efficient.

中文翻译：

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两步信任博弈中的社会抵押，动态激励和连带责任：向无银行账户的人提供贷款

信息不对称和缺乏抵押品给最需要的人分配了次优的财政资源。当无抵押借款人向金融机构求助时，存在道德风险和逆向选择会导致没有贷款。相反，集体贷款合同（连带责任，动态贷款和违约的社会成本）控制信息不对称，并在借款人之间建立了合作信任博弈，导致了无可争议的最优还款策略，因此，放款人可以放弃。当没有抵押品时，团体贷款被证明优于典型的个人借贷。社会抵押和信任是小额信贷成功工作的基础。产生的合同和相应的收益是帕累托有效的。