This paper analyzes the participation path of workers in the formal and informal sectors throughout their lives and their pension eligibilities, as well as how the social security scheme can change the aforementioned participation path. High levels of informality have impacts on the benefits that workers receive, especially their pension benefits. I use Argentinean panel data from 1995 to 2008 to construct a structural discrete choice model which estimates the population’s labor path and their pension eligibilities. I find evidence that low-educated workers have difficulties to obtain a pension by the age of 65 and even by age 70. Policy experiments show that if the parameters are fixed as in the pay-as-you-go (PAYG) model, there is a slight reduction in the years worked in the formal sector and the percentage of workers who obtain a Full pension. If the pension requirements (minimum age and years contributing) are stricter, there is an increase in the years spent in the formal sector but it is not sufficient to achieve the benchmark level of pension coverage. If the requirements are looser, there is a reduction in the amount of time spent in formality to contribute up to the new threshold.

中文翻译：

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正规和非正规部门的养恤金计划和劳动力供应

本文分析了正规和非正规部门工人一生的参与路径，养老金资格，以及社会保障计划如何改变上述参与路径。高度的非正规性会影响工人获得的福利，尤其是其退休金福利。我使用1995年至2008年的阿根廷面板数据构建了一个结构性的离散选择模型，该模型估计了人口的劳动路径及其养老金合格率。我发现有证据表明，低学历的工人到65岁甚至70岁时都很难获得养老金。政策实验表明，如果参数是按现收现付（PAYG）模型固定的，在正规部门工作的年数和获得全额养老金的工人的百分比略有下降。如果养老金要求（最低年龄和缴费年限）更加严格，则正规部门的年数会增加，但这不足以达到养老金覆盖率的基准水平。如果要求较宽松，则减少花费在形式上以达到新阈值所需的时间。